Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy: Self-consciousness and Self-reference

(Faculty of Philosophy, C/Montalegre 6, 4th floor, 08001, Barcelona)

	21. Sept. 22 (We)	
	room: Jane Addams	room: 406
09:40 – 10:00	Welcome by the Organizers	
10:00 – 11:00	Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy: Self-consciousness and Self-reference Bruna Picas (University of Barcelona)	
coffee break		
11:20 – 12:20	Idealism in Hegel and Wittgenstein Edgar Maraguat (University of Valencia)	
coffee break		
12:40 – 13:30	Fragmentos de una theoria imperfecta (Wittgenstein y la especulación) Román Cuartango (University of Barcelona)	
lunch		
14:50 – 15:40	Self-reference in Hegel's Doctrine of Essence Christina Weiss (University of Darmstadt)	Judgement and Self-Consciousness in Kant and the early Wittgenstein Simone Nota (Trinity College Dublin)
coffee break		
16:00 – 16:50	Hegel and Wittgenstein on the ‚Civil Status of a Contradiction' Simon Skempton (University of York)	Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer - and Spinoza Karl-Friedrich Kiesow (University of Hannover)
coffee break		
17:10 – 18:00	Being that can understand is world, or How much truth there is in solipsism David Lindeman (Georgetown University)	
coffee break		
18:10 – 19:00	Self-Consciousness and the Threat of Privacy: Reading Chapter Four of the Phenomenology in the Light of Wittgenstein's Case Against a Private Language Aran Gharibpour (Austin Community College)	
20:00 – 23:00		

	22. Sept. 22 (Thu)	
	room: Jane Addams	room: 406
09:40 – 10:00		
10:00 – 11:00	'The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious!' - Is it? Ego-centred reflections in the wake of Kant, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Strawson Hans-Johann Glock (University of Zurich)	
coffee break		
11:20 – 12:20	The Silence of the Philosophical Investigations Sebastian Rödl (University of Leipzig)	
coffee break		
12:40 – 13:30	Three Types of the Self in Hegel and Wittgenstein Alexander Berg (University of Zurich)	
lunch		
15:30 – 16:20	Philosophy is really more work on oneself. Kant and Wittgenstein on the Limits of Sense Jens Pier (University of Leipzig)	The Wittgenstein's ladder as a metaphor of self-development - cognition as a practice of self-reference Filip Gołaszewski (University of Warsaw)
coffee break		
16:40 – 17:30	Can a form of life be self-conscious and self-referring? Konrad Wyszkowski (University of Warsaw)	Die Aktivität der Negation als Voraussetzung für das Selbstsbewusstsein und die Selbstreferenz in Hegel and Wittgenstein Giuseppa Bella (University of Catania)
coffee break		
17:50 – 18:40	Lo indecible de sí mismo: posibilidad y límites de la autoconciencia Ricard Sapena (University of Barcelona)	The Activity of Life: Form of Life and Ethical State between Wittgenstein and Hegel Silvia Locatelli (University of Lisbon)
coffee break		
18:10 – 19:00		
20:00 – 23:00	conference dinner – Market – https://andilana.com/locales/market-2/	

Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy: Self-consciousness and Self-reference (Faculty of Philosophy, C/Montalegre 6, 4th floor, 08001, Barcelona)	
	23. September 22 (Fri)
	room: Jane Addams
09:40 – 10:00	
10:00 – 11:00	Science and Pseudoscience. Hegel and Wittgenstein on the nature of philosophy Luca Illetterati (University of Padua)
coffee break	
11:20 – 12:20	Speculative Realism vs. Transcendental Idealism Jakub Mácha (Masaryk University Brno)
coffee break	
12:40 – 13:30	Private language vs. private speech Denis Kaidalov (Charles University Prague)
lunch	
15:30 – 16:20	Wittgenstein and Sartre on Self-Consciousness and Self-reference Christos Kalpakidis (University of Bonn)
coffee break	
16:40 – 17:30	Hegel's recognition in context: A Wittgensteinian pragmatist approach of recognition Cristóbal Balbontin Gallo (Austral University of Chile)
coffee break	
17:50 – 18:40	
coffee break	fieldtrip, social programm
18:10 – 19:00	

Giuseppa Bella (University of Catania)

Die Aktivität der Negation als Voraussetzung für das Selbstsbewusstsein und die Selbstreferenz in Hegel and Wittgenstein

In diesem Beitrag werden die Rolle und die Merkmale der Negation in der Spekulation von Hegel und Wittgenstein als operative Voraussetzung der Konstitution des Selbstbewusstseins und der Selbstreferenz untersucht. Ausgehend von der intrinsischen relationalen Dimension, die die beiden Philosophien gemeinsam haben (hier insbesondere *Philosophische Untersuchungen* für Wittgenstein), werden wir uns auf den nicht absoluten, sondern generativen und relationalen oder inferenzialen Charakter der Negation konzentrieren und unterscheiden zwischen der inferenzialen Negation inklusiver Art nach Hegel und der inferenzialen Negation ausschliessender Art nach Wittgenstein. Diese Polarität wird unterschiedliche Ergebnisse in Bezug auf die Konzepte des Selbstbewusstseins und der Selbstrefenz hervorbringen.

Die relationale Negation hat bei Hegel einen logischen und ontologischen Wert, sowohl aus rein historischer, prozessualer als auch aus zeitlicher dialektischer Sicht: In der *Phänomenologie* wird sich das Individuum seiner selbst als Geist durch die dialektische Überwindung der relativen Schritte der Negativität und ihrer Aufhebung als notwendiges Moment des Prozesses bewusst, in der *Logik* aus zeitlos -dialektischer Sicht. Im Olymp des logischen Denkens, der die reale ontologische Ebene spekulativ widerspiegelt, werden Begriffe prozessual ahistorisch definiert, einschließlich ihrer Differenz in ihrer Definition. Bei Hegel ist die Negation demnach insofern inklusiv, als dass der Schöpfungsprozess durch kontinuierliche dialektische Negationen erfolgt:

Alle Momente sind in dem realen und logischen dialektischen Prozess als intrinsische Passagen desselben enthalten. Wenn die relationale Negativität dem Prozess der Selbsterkenntnis und der Selbstgestaltung oder dem definierenden und damit generativen Prozess eines Begriffs immanent ist, folgt daraus, dass die Selbstreferenz, also die logische Form der Verbindung zwischen dem Selbst und seinem Anderssein, das Selbstbewusstsein voraussetzt, beziehungsweise einen Akt von Selbstwahrnehmung in dieser Prozessualität (Entwicklung).

In den *Philosophische[n] Untersuchungen* verfolgt die Sprache die Grenze der Selbsreferenz nicht in ihrer rein logischen Bedeutung (wie es im "Tractatus" der Fall war), sondern in ihremkontextuellen Umfeld. Relationale Negation, das heißt Inferenz, setzt die Gültigkeit der Sprache und damit ihre Bedeutung erst ausgehend von einem Schluss auf ihren Kontext voraus. Sie behält ihre rein logische Dimension als abgrenzende nicht denotative Tätigkeit, außerdem kann, auch wenn ihr rein ontologischer Charakter nicht wesentlich behauptet werden kann, sicherlich behauptet werden, dass sie eine Richtung des ontologischen Sinns relativ zu ihrem wirklichen Gebrauch bewahrt (obwohl sie für den Gebrauch auch als nicht übereinstimmend mit der Realität verstanden werden kann, sondern als Interpretation derselben). Ein Satz hat nur innerhalb seines Bezugskontextes Bedeutung, aber er kann in einem anderen Kontext eine andere Bedeutung haben oder überhaupt keine Bedeutung haben. Daher ist es notwendig den Bezugskontext zu definieren und den Kontext oder die Kontexte darin zu leugnen, in denen dieser Satz eine andere Bedeutung hat oder keinen Sinn ergibt.

Die Gültigkeit eines Satzes hängt daher von der Negation anderer logischer Bereiche ab, auf die er sich beziehen könnte und die seine Bedeutung negieren könnten. In diesem Sinne ist diese schlussfolgernde Negation auch ausschliesslich, weil sie verschiedenen Welten Leben einhauchen kann, die nicht notwendigerweise miteinander interagieren müssen, um sich selbst zu konstituieren . In diesem Sinne ist die Selbstreferenz die *condicio sine qua non* für den Sinnhorizont des sprachlichen Kontextes und geht dem Selbstbewusstein voraus: Auch das Bewusstsein seiner selbst findet in einem Sinnhorizont statt, der sich je nach Bedeutungszugehörigkeit von Zeit zu Zeit ändern kann Sprachgebrauch in diesem Zusammenhang.

Alexander Berg (University of Zurich)

Three Types of the Self in Hegel and Wittgenstein

Abstract: Hegel distinguishes three main types of the self – the soul, the consciousness and the mind. He seeks to use these concepts to rediscover the meaning of Aristotle's works on the soul (Περὶ ψυχῆς) and, at the same time, to counteract certain scientistic tendencies within the philosophy of mind.

Although Wittgenstein (most likely) was not aware of these Hegelian distinctions, his own use of the self exhibits some remarkable similarities to Hegel's, and Wittgenstein too develops his understanding of the self by first examining the scientific psychology of his time and delineating his own position by way of contrast with it.

This talk examines three areas in which Wittgenstein substantially developed his understanding of the self. The sequence follows the order in which these areas became significant for Wittgenstein's thinking, and compares them in each case with the three main Hegelian types of the self.

Cristóbal Balbontin Gallo (Austral University of Chile)

Hegel's' recognition in context:
A Wittgensteinian pragmatist approach of recognition.

One of Axel Honneth's remarks in his book *The Struggle for recognition* is his intention to preserve the otherness in the intersubjective economy of recognition. With this statement, Honneth highlights the singularity of the writings of Jena known as the *System of Ethical Life*, where Hegel according to Honneth claims the intersubjective dimension of recognition of an individual's identity that introduces a moral tension that pushes social progress.

Nevertheless, from the point of view of the history of philosophy, we can criticize Honneth's reading of Hegel. Indeed, for Hegel's *System of Ethical Life* it is only through the context of the Absolute and in the Absolute that an accomplished recognition of each individual as a whole is possible. However this approach can be criticized because it rests rooted on a metaphysical understanding of Hegel.

Nevertheless, it is possible to achieve a post-metaphysical scope of context in recognition. Wittgenstein has shown the importance of the practical context, as social dimension of language, in the understanding of sense and meaning. In fact, following this Wittgensteinian pragmatist approach, recognition of an individual's identity implies a speech act that presupposes a concept that makes it possible. Speech act that is rooted in a normative and social *milieu* that Wittgenstein points well out in his *Philosophical Investigations* (§199). This is something that also Hegel saw well in pointing out that every representation (*Vorstellung*) takes place within the limits of the presentation (*Darstellung*), which constitutes the concept. Recognition hence takes place within an objective setting. From this point of view, the richness of the Hegelian analysis of recognition linked to the objective spirit in the *Encyclopedia* is underestimated by Honneth, who privileges the understanding of intersubjectivity without a context in his lecture of the young Hegel.

Aran Gharibpour (Austin Community College)

Self-Consciousness and the Threat of Privacy: Reading Chapter Four of the Phenomenology in the Light of Wittgenstein's Case Against a Private Language

John McDowell suggests that Hegel's rather unexpected introduction of a second self-consciousness in chapter four of the *Phenomenology* endangers the continuity of his argument, unless the other self- consciousness is understood metaphorically. As I shall show, however, introducing minimal sociality is a necessary step in the development of the concept of self-consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology* and Wittgenstein's case against the possibility of a private language in the *Philosophical Investigations* could help clarify why.

According to Wittgenstein, the meaningfulness of a language is dependent on the possibility of determining the (in)correctness of its judgments. In a private language, to determine the correctness of "S is A", where A is an untranslatable symbol standing for sensation S, one has no means other than pointing at sensation S and shouting A, a reformulation of the judgment "S is A". As the judgment and the process of evaluating the judgment are nothing but the same demonstrative expression, there is no standard of correctness in a private language. Without such a standard, private judgments cannot be correct or incorrect and therefore yield no meaning.

The structure of the self-conception of Hegel's self-consciousness at the beginning of chapter four suffers from the same fate. Self-consciousness, as emerged from the dialectic of Understanding, knows itself as the sole determin*ator* of objects but knows this only through its act of determin*ing* them. Self- consciousness' first-person report of its interaction with the objects, then, is the only way to determine the correctness of its self-conception. As in the case of a private language, this logically jeopardizes the meaningfulness of self-consciousness' self-conception. Hegel's introduction of the other self-consciousness is a remedy to this problem. Although the condition of sociality does not exclude all the skeptical doubts regarding the nature of meaning, it can at least avoid its impossibility which infects an essentially private point of view.

Hans-Johann Glock (University of Zurich)

'The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious!' - Is it? Ego-centred reflections in the wake of Kant, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Strawson

I use this quote from Wittgenstein's *Notebooks* (5.8.16) as a launch pad for looking at the metaphysical apotheosis of the idea of a self or ego and for promoting its deflationary demotion. The first section discusses Wittgenstein's early perspective on the self, self-consciousness and self-reference. It shows how he transposed the perplexities of Cartesianism, Humeanism and Kantianism onto a linguistic plane. Under the influence of Schopenhauer's idealism, the young Wittgenstein adopted an obscure kind of transcendental solipsism. At the same time his linguistic turn set him on course for demystifying the self, namely by looking at the peculiarities of the first-person pronoun singular (section 2). This starts in the early thirties with the dead-end of a 'phenomenological' language from which 'I' has been eliminated. It ends with his suggestion that `It is correct, although paradoxical, to say: `"I" does not refer to (*bezeichnet*) a person' (MS 116, 215). Section 3 critically discusses this proposal, defending the idea that the use of 'I' is a limiting case of reference (see Glock & Hacker 1996). There are no 'selves', but there are flesh-and-blood persons capable of recognizing and expressing their respective perspectives within the objective world. Alas, this leaves two other puzzles going back to Kantian 'transcendental unity of apperception', the idea that conceptual experiences must be self-ascribable. One is the fact—seen through a looking-glass darkly by Schopenhauer—that we cannot adopt an external, spectator perspective on our own thoughts and beliefs (section 4). The other is the connection between the self-ascribability and the conceptual articulation of experiences brilliantly discussed by Strawson (section 5). I will try to show that both are best handled in the down-to-earth spirit of Wittgensteinian 'grammatical remarks' (aka conceptual truths). There is no such thing as my 'self', but there is me … and you, and you!
Keywords: self, solipsism, first-person pronoun, reference, first-person pronoun, deflationism; Wittgenstein, Kant, Schopenhauer, Strawson.

Filip Gołaszewski (University of Warsaw)

The Wittgenstein's ladder as a metaphor of self-development - cognition as a practice of self-reference

The aim of the presentation is to discuss famous Wittgenstein's metaphor of the ladder from the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* in the comparision with Hegel's idea of self-development presented in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There are a lot of hidden similarities in the structure of both texts in context of self-reference. If we put aside the formal and historical differences and focus on the practical aspect of cognition we may discover striking resemblance between those two important texts' by Hegel and Wittgenstein. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel describes the journey of self-consciousness throughout different experiences oriented to achieve the absolute knowledge in the end of the whole process. According to Hegel those experiences may be perceived as steps on the way to philosophical wisdom. The condition for development of consciousness is the rejection of its former beliefs in order to achieve the more sophisticated philosophical perspective. More than a hundred years later Wittgenstein constructed a treatise with an ambition to solve all philosophical problems setting the boundaries of meaningful linguistic statements. In the thesis 6.54 philosopher introduced the metaphor of the abandoned ladder. After climbing on top of it and understanding the boundaries of the meaningful language one has to reject all of the steps – represented by the consecutive theses of the treatise. This practical advice seems to resemble Hegel's conception of consciousness transforming through rejection of its former beliefs. However, there seem to be important differences in those attempts to the process of self-development concerning both the result of the whole journey and the methods adopted to achieve transformation. Hegel introduced the specific idea of *Aufhebung* which does not seem to have a substitute in Wittgenstein's conception. Most importantly one may argue that the Hegelian absolute knowledge is much wider concept than Wittgenstein's knowledge about the limits of a meaningful statements. Therefore, it has to be examined to what extent the Wittgenstein's rejection of the ladder may be perceived in terms of Hegelian self-development of the consciousness.

Christos Kalpakidis (University of Bonn)

Wittgenstein and Sartre on Self-Consciousness and Self-reference

According to Descombes (2014), the most radical criticism of *philosophies de la conscience* is not to be found in the literature related to the so-callled querelle du sujet, but rather in Ludwig Wittgenstein. Indeed, Wittgenstein is the one who genuinely allows us to trade a philosophy of consciousness or the self for a philosophy of the first-person. The latter undermines the possibility of a philosophy of consciousness, understood as a philosophy which speaks of oneself in the first person, but somehow reifies the self as an abstract third person. Jean-Paul Sartre is, on the other hand, well-known for being an advocate of such post-Cartesian philosophy, which takes (self)- consciousness to be a key feature of humanity and a point where to start philosophy from. If Sartre really is a philosopher of consciousness in this sense, it may appear very surprising that contemporary philosophers, such as Béatrice Longuenesse (2017) or Richard Moran (2001), have seen in the work of Sartre echoes of Wittgensteinian accounts of the first-person (such as Elizabeth Anscombe's or Gareth Evans').

The most obvious place where we can find Sartre and the Wittgensteinian to agree is philosophy of action (Webb 2016). Self-consciousness is a philosophical concept which aims at grasping the special relation human beings have to their own actions, which makes them not only conscious of what they are doing, but also conscious of being the agent of what they are doing. The second point of convergence between Sartre and the Wittgensteinian rests in how they think of self-consciousness as being non-positional, i.e. not as a kind of (conscious) relation or epistemic relation to oneself. In the case of Sartre, this results from his critique of the so-called reflection theory of self-consciousness, as has been argued by the so-called Heidelberg School (esp. D. Henrich and M. Frank), who explicitly draw a historical parallel to G. Fichte (1797). Interestingly, the reflections of Sartre and the later Wittgenstein on self-consciousness have elicited similar responses in the literature. Both have been charged of being "extraordinary" and paradoxical (Evans 1982), of being mistaken for the view that self-consciousness must be taken to stand aloof from instantiation to particular human beings and for having been misunderstood to imply that consciousness is "impersonal" in more or less the sense in which "It is raining" is impersonal.

In this paper, I would like to acknowledge the fruitfulness of such a dialogue, but mainly argue that it is restricted to the negative insight that "I", as manifestation of self-consciousness, is not a referring expression and the concept of self-consciousness is a genuine one which is not to be mistaken for self-reference or consciousness of one's self.

Karl-Friedrich Kiesow (University of Hannover)

Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer - and Spinoza

Many interpreters have maintained that the early Wittgenstein has been under the influence of Kant's transcendental idealism or Schopenhauer's subjective idealism. Indeed, it may be said that the projection theory developed by the author of the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* has the function to coördinate language, consciousness and the world. It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein, in some contexts, speaks of "my world", in other contexts of "the world". Whereas the former phrase is indicative of an internal relatedness of the three factors mentioned above, the latter phrase, the world without a qualifying possessive adjective, is a representative of the Kantian *Ding an sich*. And in this point there is a sharp break with Schopenhauer since Wittgenstein declares that the "the world" (!) is independent of my will. Nevertheless, there is an interface between these areas. In the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung*, Wittgenstein is aware of the transcendental role of the key words of logic, ethics and aesthetics. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, more modestly, he considers the possibility of a dependence of aspect-seeing on our volitions.

Key words: Kant, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein; subjective idealism, voluntarism

Menno Lievers (University of Utrecht)

Fichte and Wittgenstein on Immunity to Error through Misidentification

In Tugendhat (1989) an attack was launched on Fichte's account of self-consciousness, because it was based on a subject-object analysis of consciousness that ought to be replaced by a propositional account. Tugendhat appealed to Wittgenstein in claiming that mental predicates are 'open': they can be used in both first-person and third person statements. Since they have the same meaning in both and the criteria for correctness of mental ascription are always from the perspective of a third person, there is no hidden self-consciousness.

Lütterfeld has argued, implausibly, against Tugendhat that words for mental states possess a dual semantics: one for communication, one for the ineffable private experiences. However, Lütterfelds also emphasizes an interesting affinity between Fichte and Wittgenstein. They both emphasize the act-aspect of thinking (Wittgenstein, 1958, 70).

Pöggeler (1981) questioned the refuge to language for an analysis of self-consciousness. Developments withing analytic philosophy move away from language to the mind (Evans, Peacocke, Longuenesse). Fichte and Wittgenstein seem wide apart.

However, there are arguments for reading Wittgenstein as being interested in issues beyond the conceptual analysis of mental predicates. In the *Blue Book* he draws a distinction between 'I' as referring to a subject, and 'I' as it refers to an object. This has become known as 'Immunity to Error through Misidentification'. Now it is tempting to connect this with Fichte's *Grundsätze*. The first principle 'A = A' in which 'A' is replaced by 'I', is an example of a statement that is immune to error through misidentification. The second principle 'A is not A' is an example of a statement that requires further identification of an object for its verification and is therefore not so immune.

Does this force us to accept epistemological idealism? Cassam (1997) maintains self-consciousness requires consciousness of oneself as a body among other objects. Longuenesse (2017) insists, on the contrary, that there is a fundamental difference between self-consciousness proper to the thinking subject and consciousness of oneself as an object in the world.

Support for her position could be gained from following Fichte in insisting that the I only exists in the act of experiencing, where an awareness of oneself as a body doesn't. (See also Strawson 2012). I want to elaborate on this position by studying Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), part I.

David Lindeman (Georgetown University)

Being that can understand is world, or How much truth there is in solipsism

Sein, das verstanden weden kann, ist Sprache. (Gadamer)

There is no recognized way things might be recognition of which does not involve some way of taking things to be. This is, if you like, a master argument for all known entities being representation-dependent: they are always represented *as* such-and-such. The known world, then, is a totality of facts, and the intentional objects of which these are composed. This is not a visionary idealism, to appropriate the terms of Kant's *Prolegomena*, nor a dreaming idealism. It is close kin to Kant's transcendental idealism. It is Wittgenstein's 'solipsism'-which-collapses-into-realism. For every way I represent *the world* to be, there is some way *I represent* the world to be. The I of the 'I think' which accompanies all my representations is limit of my world (TLP, 5.632, 5.641); and the representational system comprising these representations is my language: to wit, the only language I understand (TLP, 5.62). So its limit, and that of its logic, are likewise limits of my world (TLP, 5.6, 5.61). The coincidence of these limits – to language, logic, world – has deep resonances with lines of thought as old as philosophy, having their origin in

and richly developed in the German philosophical tradition. It was G.E. Moore who suggested to

λόγος, the principle of reason or intelligibility,

Wittgenstein the title *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. It is, I think, not incidental that Wittgenstein had

contemplated the title *Der Satz*. Etymology, being the archeology of thought, suggests a connection

in the common root of λόγος and λέξις: *viz.* λέγω, 'I say', 'I speak'. Here one might be put in mind of

Hegel's dictum, 'the rational is real, the real is rational', and the absolute idealism it implicates. And

indeed, though one might be inclined to identify Wittgenstein's world with Kant's phenomenal

world, Wittgenstein draws no distinction – in so many words – between this and the noumenal.

Where does Wittgenstein stand here? There is a clue, I argue, in passages directly preceding those

just cited, in his account of the logical form of 'I think that p'.

Simone Nota (Trinity College Dublin)

Judgement and Self-Consciousness in Kant and the Early Wittgenstein

In this essay, I argue that there are some striking similarities between Kant and the early Wittgenstein's respective accounts of judgement and self-consciousness.

Both Kant and the early Wittgenstein understand by judgement a rule-governed and intentional combination of terms that represents a combination of objects.

In Kant, the rules are the categories—mind-dependent ways in which given objects (appearances) can combine with each other (e.g. as substance and property, as cause and effect).

In the early Wittgenstein, the rules are the forms of objects—ways in which given objects can combine with each other (e.g. spatially, temporally, chromatically).

Judgements are not only rule-governed, but also intentional—they are *about* objects.

For both Kant and the early Wittgenstein, the intentionality of judgement goes back to (self) consciousness. In Kant, this is the 'I think', in the early Wittgenstein 'the Subject'.

The 'I think' relates intuitions to objects, by combining intuitions in judgement, in agreement with the categories.

The 'Subject' relates names to objects, by combining names in judgement, in agreement with the forms of these objects.

The *act* of combining terms (e.g. intuitions or names) according to rules, thereby relating them to objects, is *judging*. It is an act of the 'I' or Subject (B129-130). In a way, it *is* the 'I' or Subject.

For both Kant and the early Wittgenstein, this act—the 'I' or Subject—*issues in* judgement, but it is not on that account an object of judgement (cf. NB, 7.8.16 and A346/B404). For if it were, there should have to be another 'I' or Subject that could judge about it (ibid.)

For this reason, the 'I' or Subject—the act of judging—is not itself *articulable in* judgement. Rather, it is the *feeling* of oneself as s/he who judges about things (cf. *Prol*, 4:334), and thereby as the limit of all that which may be judged (T, 5.632 and 6.45).

Jens Pier (University of Leipzig)

"Philosophy is really more work on oneself": Kant and Wittgenstein on the Limits of Sense

In trying to make sense of things we can reach certain bounds—e.g., in the attempt to make judgments about the noumenal or to talk about Tractarian logical form. There are two fundamental ways we can think about these bounds: as limits or as limitations. Limits are constitutive and "non-contrastive," nothing lies beyond them; limitations are restrictive and "contrastive," they separate what is included in them from what is not. A common theme of Kant and Wittgenstein was their keen attunement to this distinction – and how easy it is to bungle it and slip from talk about one into talk about the other.

My talk will proceed in three sections: §1 will introduce the issue of limits of sense and give two standard examples of how they might figure in everyday talk and philosophical reflection. §2 will examine two pertinent quotes by Kant and Wittgenstein each to motivate their shared sensibility for the problems with these limits. §3 will sketch the general shape of a critical response to the limits of sense from a jointly Kantian and Wittgensteinian vantage point.

The upshot will be that Kant and Wittgenstein can be seen as engaged in a project of liberatory self-understanding: their goal is to attain a view of ourselves that sees our ways of understanding as fine for what they are, not as ill-suited for what they are not. What they struggle with philosophically thus represents a struggle for all of us insofar as we are human beings, finite thinking creatures tasked with reconciling reason and finitude.

Simon Skempton (University of York)

Hegel and Wittgenstein on the 'Civil Status of a Contradiction'

In *Philosophical Investigations* section 125, Wittgenstein writes: 'The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.' He regards it as a mistake to conceive of a contradiction and its resolution merely in terms of formal logic, a logic abstracted from the pragmatic social circumstances in which it is put to use. He suggests that a contradiction is what occurs when we become entangled in our own rules, the rules that we are committed to within the social practice of a particular language-game. Such an entanglement occurs when things turns out differently from what we meant or intended when following those rules.

This paper will argue that Hegel's dialectic can be read as evincing this later-Wittgensteinian notion of the social nature of contradiction. Hegelian contradictions can be demonstrated to be performative contradictions between the content of an utterance and the social preconditions and context of the act of uttering, or what Slavoj Žižek, in *For They Know Not What They Do*, calls the gap between someone's enunciated 'theoretical position' and their 'position of enunciation' (1991, p.143). A classic example of such a contradiction would be how the very act of asserting scepticism contradicts the claims of scepticism. A similar interpretation of Hegel's dialectic is put forward by Robert Brandom when he claims that the dialectical process is implicitly driven by a social or pragmatic version of the law of non- contradiction which comes into play when there is a performative contradiction between the preconditions of an instituting act of determining and its instituted determinate content. When discussing Hegel in his *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, Brandom writes that judgment and action involve 'the activity of applying concepts: producing acts the correctness or incorrectness of which is determined by the rule or norm by which one has implicitly bound oneself in performing that act' (2002, p.212).

Konrad Wyszkowski (University of Warsaw)

Can a form of life be self-conscious and self-referring?

Among other concepts present in later Wittgenstein's works, the form of life (*Lebensform*) is one of the best suited (if not the best one) to reconstruct his socio-ontological standpoint. That is so, because the concept of the form of life is not denoting only some language or thought phenomena, but all the natural and cultural conditions that determine (or at least influence) the way in which people living in the given form speak, think and act. Moreover this concept at least suggests that there is some unity, which comprises all the said conditions and allows to present some general outline of the process of determining (or influencing) by the conditions. In this respect Wittgensteinian form of life seems similar to the Hegelian spirit (*Geist*).

Nevertheless, the differences are striking: The form of life is contingent (i), particular (ii) and, as I will elaborate, naturalistic (iii). The spirit it necessary, at least *ex post* (i), universal (ii) and, as I will elaborate, historistic (iii).

I argue that the relation between the form of life and the spirit could be seen as a diachronic relation of the evolution of the human kind from the state of lack of self-consciousness and self-reference to the state of acquiring them. The later Wittgenstein's investigations are – from this point of view – the project of thinking like the first humans, before the emergence of social self-consciousness, especially in the form of philosophy (the last shape of the absolute spirit). But this is not a project set up in vain, as it adds to the Hegelian view the naturalistic perspective, which challenges the Hegelian dictum: "die *Metamorphose* kommt nur dem Begriff als solchem zu" (*Enzyklopädie*, §249), and hence gives place also to the evolutionary thinkers: Lamarck, Schelling and Darwin.