

Pavel Arazim (Czech Academy of Sciences)

### **Implicit Rules and their Expressibility by Means of Logic**

Brandom, a contemporary author heavily relying both on Hegel and Wittgenstein, ascribes logic quite an important role, namely that of being an organ of semantic consciousness. This is closely linked to the notion of implicit rules which can be rendered explicit by means of logic.

My claim is that this view of logic is incompatible with Wittgenstein. By considering no language game as central in the way Brandom claims that the game of giving and asking for reasons is central, Wittgenstein can remain true to his attitude that philosophy should advance no theses. In fact, although Brandom claims that inferring is as practical as drawing a nail, from Wittgensteinian perspective he remains too theoretical. For Brandom, there is still something hidden as an implicit rule that remains to be unearthed. But not only that these rules can change all the time so that any attempt at making them explicit might come too late, there are more fundamentally dynamic, as they at any given time tend to go in more directions. And yet, we can observe with Wittgenstein, this fact typically does not inhibit our daily usage of language. Overall, the Brandomian implicit rules seem to be written in a peculiar language of our practice which resembles the language of the Augustinian child that Wittgenstein sought to undermine.

And what can Hegel have to do with this? In fact, when Brandom turns to him and acknowledges the historical nature of rules, he finally sees them as truly embodied. Rules are truly specific, it makes only a limited sense to speak of the same rules in different historical context. Then the idea of logic as making rules explicit loses most of its ground.

Thomas Auinger (University of Vienna)

### **Logische Gestalten: Wittgenstein und Hegel in widersprüchlicher Einigkeit. Zur Fundierung der weltspiegelnden und spekulativen Logizität.**

Einleitend wird zunächst gerade nicht auf Wittgenstein und Hegel eingegangen, sondern unter Zuhilfenahme einer anderen philosophischen Position eine Art von Lektüreperspektive bestimmt, worin auf vorerst noch allgemeine Weise ein verbindender Leserahmen in Ausblick gestellt wird. Für diese Position eignet sich am besten ein modern interpretierter Pragmatismus bzw. Neopragmatismus, wie er insbesondere von Richard Rorty vertreten wurde und aktuell von Robert Brandom auf sehr elaborierte Weise fortgesetzt wird. Brandom bietet dann eine Schnittstelle, worin schon etwas konkreter die Ansätze des Deutschen Idealismus mit den Positionen der analytischen Philosophie, die ihrerseits wieder in erheblichem Maße ihrer Herkunft nach auf Wittgenstein zurückgehen, verbunden werden.

Nach dieser Einleitung werden die Positionen von Hegel und Wittgenstein näher betrachtet. Dabei ist der Fokus auf die Bestimmung ihrer Logikauffassungen bzw. auf den Status des Logischen überhaupt gelegt. Was die Frage der Fundierung der Logik betrifft, so lässt sich für Wittgenstein etwas leichter angeben, woraus sich die Logizität speist. Hierbei beziehe ich mich in erster Linie auf seine Bild- bzw. Abbildtheorie im Tractatus. Für Hegel ist diese Angabe schwieriger, weil er der Sache nach die Antwort auf die Fundierungsfrage der Logik in die Entwicklung der

spekulativen Logik selbst verlegt. Prinzipiell hängt dabei alles mit der Bestimmung des Denkens bzw. des reinen Denkens zusammen. Für das Erreichen des Standpunkts der Logik als solcher kann die letzte Stufe der Phänomenologie des Geistes und implizit der gesamte Verlauf der sich entwickelnden Bewusstseinsgestalten herangezogen werden. Im Vortrag wird darauf Bezug genommen, wie dieser Standpunkt zu verstehen ist und warum das Denken oder auch das echte Denken das Signum des Logischen darstellt. Es werden gewisse Übereinstimmungen zwischen Wittgenstein und Hegel herausgestellt, aber auch aufgezeigt, welche erhebliche Unterschiede in ihren Zugängen bestehen. Den Abschluss bilden ein kurzes Resümee und eine nochmalige Einschätzung der prinzipiellen Bestimmungen eher wittgensteinianisch oder eher hegelianisch orientierter Logikauffassungen.

Giuseppa Bella (University of Catania)

### **Hegel and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Content**

In this paper I propose an analysis of the relationship between logical form and its content in Hegel and Wittgenstein, i.e. an analysis of the relationship between logical form and ontological reality (or world). I will mainly consider the Science of Logic for Hegel and the Tractatus for Wittgenstein. The two philosophers agree in the two-to-one, necessary and specular relationship between logic and its content, since the only way in which the world "manifests itself" (Hegel) or can "be represented" (Wittgenstein) is logical thinking and there is nothing outside of it (Hegel) or at least nothing makes sense outside of it (Wittgenstein). In fact, both also agree on the futility or senselessness of the question relating to the reflection on the method of logic, since logic itself is the only form of the possible world and no explanatory preambles are needed. For Hegel it is necessary, in fact, to "immerse oneself in the thing itself" to avoid the risk of the evil infinity of the philosophies of reflection, in fact his Logic takes place entirely on the level of Absolute Knowledge, i.e. the absolute coincidence between form and content.

In the same way Wittgenstein argues that one cannot make sensible statements concerning the modalities of the logical form: the only sensible propositions concern facts and statements about logic as a form of the world are not propositions about facts, therefore propositions about this form are not sensible. However, the two philosophers elaborate a logic that differs in the modality of relationship between logical thought and the world and therefore, consequently, in the logical form of logical thought. Hegel's logic is not a pure tool or method, but it is the study of the structure of Reality, this means that thinking and being coincide and logic coincides with ontology (ie with metaphysics).

It is thought itself which, in its progress, realizes itself and its own content. The different categories through which his logic develops can be considered as successive definitions. The logical form of this logic must therefore be dialectical, specular the very movement of being and therefore must be formally inclusive, i.e. an identity that includes differences. Wittgenstein also places thought and the world in a necessary and one-to-one relationship, saying that thought is the logical image of facts and also places another one-to-one relationship between thought and language, saying that language allows one to express in a logical form what is abstractly contained in thought.

So ultimately there is a one-to-one correspondence or isomorphism between

language and world, which is equivalent to say between language and facts, since for Wittgenstein the world is exclusively the totality of facts. Thus, linguistic expressions can be seen as a form of geometric projection, where language is the changing form of the projection and the logical structure of the expression is the invariable geometric relation. This would preserve, in theory, the identity between thinking and being already present in Hegel's Logic. The problem arises when Wittgenstein states that thought is the proposition endowed with meaning and the proposition endowed with meaning is only and exclusively that which describes the facts of the world: Language can express being only to the extent that it expresses facts of being and nothing else. The logical identity between being and thought is maintained only for a part of being, i.e. for the experience of being, not for being in its entirety, therefore the logical form of Wittgenstein's logic turns out to be excluding and not inclusive, logic as an image of the world turns out to be its own limit. The nothingness of being or the limit of being which in the Hegelian Logic was resolved by the dialectical movement between Being and Nothingness (going beyond the Kantian noumenon) becomes for Wittgenstein a nothingness of logical being or a nothingness of logical language and falls into a world that cannot be experienced linguistically (distancing itself, however, from the Kantian noumenon).

Alexander Berg (University of Zurich)

### **The Method of Absolute Negativity as a Foundation of Logic in Wittgenstein and Hegel**

Why does the *Tractatus* end in such a peculiar, paradoxical, self-negating way? This presentation traces Wittgenstein's philosophical development in Cambridge through the prism of his psychological studies and research. One major influence was Charles Samuel Myers, under whose guidance Wittgenstein developed his own psychological experiments and methods in Cambridge. Myers's explicitly empirical, scientific approach also paved the way for the even deeper impression that William James and his work *The Varieties of Religious Experience* later made on the young Wittgenstein.

Through the *Varieties*, Wittgenstein found inspiration in the rich tradition of Christian mysticism, which prompted him not only to make certain momentous decisions in his own personal life, but also to consider how the insights of the mystics might be translatable into a philosophical method. James's references to Hegel's philosophy and his project of a 'method of absolute negativity' are particularly notable in this regard.

The presentation charts the course of this intellectual development, in which Wittgenstein attempted to unite his logical and philosophical insights with certain ethical demands rooted in our form of life. This ultimately culminated in the literary form of his early masterwork, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

Lorenzo Cammi (University of Pittsburgh)

### **Logic as Foundation of Knowledge. Hegel's Conceptual Realism and Wittgenstein's Solipsistic Realism**

I focus on Hegel's and Wittgenstein's stances towards subjective and objective logic, that is the logic of the I and the logic of the world – of its substance, to be precise. Now, logic has the task of unifying and separating what it refers to; so, I will point out that, while Hegel's principle of unity and division lies in the subject, Wittgenstein considers such principle to be found in the world. This way, my line of argument aims to show how logic founds the possibility of knowledge. Specifically, I will argue that Hegel's and Wittgenstein's views on the foundation of logic lead to conceptual realism and solipsistic realism, respectively.

Both share the conviction that logic precedes every experience, but their agreement ends here.

On the one hand, I take Hegel's objective logic to be dependent on the subjective one. Indeed, the possibility of knowing the world by the subject lies in the logic of the Concept, which fragments the substance of the world into determinations of things, that are in turn parasitic to thought determinations. Then, since the latter possess not only an epistemological dignity but also an ontological one, Hegel's view on logic is compatible with a form of conceptual realism.

On the other hand, in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein maintains that the logic of the substance of the world is prior to the subjective logic, where the latter merely reflects the former. Indeed, the substance of the world gathers every possibility of the ways the world might be, whereas the subject can just acknowledge what exists and what does not. However, the subject here at play is not the kind of transcendental subject identifiable with the Hegelian Concept; rather, Wittgenstein refers to the empirical subject. For this reason, Wittgenstein's perspective on logic leads to a form of solipsistic realism.

Bangrui Chen (University of Chicago)

### **Critique of Additive Theory of Logic: Variations in Hegel and Early Wittgenstein**

Hegel charges Kant's transcendental logic as a formalism and subjective psychologism. A century later, when Wittgenstein writes down his *Notebooks* and *Tractatus*, he is thought to raise some important objections to Frege's and early Russell's doctrines of logic. Though belonging to different philosophical traditions, I argue that both Hegel and Wittgenstein target the same conception of logic, namely *Additive Theory of Logic* (AT).

When Aristotle defines nature as form according to logos, he specifies Parmenides's doctrine: To think and to be are the same. The notion of logic discussed here is Aristotelian, in the sense that the one and the same logic rules both realms of (objective) nature (*phusis*) and (subjective) mind (*nous*). This contradicts the standard idea that logic is (only) the principles of thinking. The Aristotelian theme reappears in Hegel and Wittgenstein. Construed in Hegel's sentences, the aim of logic is to show that "to be is to be intelligible" and "thinking is being". And in Wittgenstein's words, the world, that which is, must be logical.

Supporters of AT, e.g., Kant and Frege/Russell, do not accept the Aristotelian notion. By contrast, AT states: logic exists only in one of the two realms, and the

extension of it to another realm is merely an additive process. This could be puzzling. AT consists of *two layers*: one concerns the object, the givenness of which is independent of any logical functioning of the mind (so that logic is added to the objective); the other concerns the proposition, which has the objective logical validity prior to the mind's subjective recognition of it (so that logic is added to the subjective). AT hence oscillates the position of logic between subjective and objective.

The puzzle can be solved, I suggest, if adopting Hegel's and Wittgenstein's strategies towards the two layers of AT respectively, i.e., a combination of (1) onto/ logo hylomorphism and (2) psycho/logical monism. As a result, (1) logic is pervasive not only in thought but already in phusis/*ontos* (the matter) as the prior potentiality, and (2) a proposition "p" and the consciousness of that "p" should not be taken separately.

Ramesh Dheeravath (University of Hyderabad)

### **In Defense of the Inexpressible: Wittgenstein and Hegel on the Unspeakable.**

As a major point of difference between Wittgenstein's and Hegel's philosophies, the concept of the 'unspeakable' and conflicting philosophical views concerning it can be observed in their major works. Wittgenstein argues that the 'logical form' of the world is unspeakable, but that the propositions of language can represent the facts and things of the world. In contrast, Hegel denotes the unspeakable as the immediate and finite beings and instances referred to by language, whereas 'logical form' is contained in thinking and language, as a 'concept'. Rather than identifying the unspeakable with language's 'limits', as Wittgenstein did in his earlier and later philosophical writings, Hegel understands language as limitless and infinite. As a result, Wittgenstein's and Hegel's philosophies can be related philosophically productively: Wittgenstein's limits, interpreted in Hegelian terms, are not limited to language itself, but do manifest themselves within the use of language, as human finitude relates universal meanings to immediate situations. In addition to this, Hegel's concept of contradiction can also be found here. Hegel and Wittgenstein both contributed significantly to the philosophy of language in this regard. A dialectical understanding of language is also significantly influenced by them.

Marcus Döller (University of Erfurt)

### **Reflections on the Status on Representation and Articulation of the Logical Form in Wittgenstein and Hegel**

Both Wittgenstein and Hegel think the logical form in its very condition as something that cannot be represented. Whereas Wittgenstein says "Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them." Hegel writes "we must observe right at the beginning that the proposition, in the form of a *judgment*, is not adept to express speculative truths" – both sentences are nothing but different formulations for one and the same thought. In the paper I am going to show why Wittgenstein and Hegel both think, that the logical form cannot be represented in propositions and judgements but at the same time have to make use of propositions and judgements.

If propositions are not able to “represent [the] logical form” what does it mean that the logical form mirrors within propositions? If the judgement is not able “to express speculative truths” what does it mean that judgements are not able to articulate the “speculative truth” within the form of judgement? I take Wittgenstein to be saying that we have to conceptualise a strong concept of negativity in order to understand how logical forms represent themselves. To think representation of logical forms means at the same time we have to think how the logical form disappears within propositions and it realises at the same time. I take Hegel to be claiming that we have to think a strong concept of incapacity in order to understand why the judgement is not able “to express speculative truth” and needs it at the same time.

My way to deal with this paradox, that the logical form shows up in propositions and judgements but at the same time the way in which the logical forms expresses itself in propositions and judgments makes the logical form withdrawn in its very representation. This is why a dialectical conception of the logical form needs a theory of negativity internal to the form of logical representation itself which is unavoidable.

Karlo Gardavski

### **Wittgenstein's (Methodo)logical nihilism**

The aim of this work is to present the idea of the late Wittgenstein according to which, due to the multiplicity of language practice, there cannot be a formal tool for the explication of norms. For the late Wittgenstein, norms must be understood as a product of language practice (normative pragmatism). Wittgenstein rejects any attempt to look for principles, formal rules and rigid coordinates in an attempt to understand meaning (logical and semantic nihilism). Accordingly, language practice is guided by norms (they are part of practice), but he believes that it is not necessary to explain norms through a specific system-theoretical pattern. The reason for this position is skepticism about philosophy and its method. There is a way to articulate norms by using rules (*Regel*), and thus pragmatism becomes methodologically correct for Wittgenstein if meaning depends on use or description of use. Wittgenstein, in a more explicit way, criticizes the idea of one method and one analysis in philosophy, i.e. mathematical logic (more precisely, the logical analysis of language). The new logic developed by Frege and Russell was to become a weapon that would distinguish meaningful statements from the meaningless ones. The idea of a method blinded the work of philosophers, because the method became a moratorium on truth, correctness, meaning etc. In his late turn in philosophy, Wittgenstein looks at the idea of logic as Law, as a form of curse that attempts to reduce the richness of language practice with artificial laws. Mathematical logic merely translates items of everyday language into its notation. To cure philosophy of the disease that, according to Wittgenstein, is caused by logic is to give up on the idea of one method, which is why Wittgenstein's late philosophy is marked by a turn to pragmatics.

Øystein Daae Gjertsen (Tromsø)

### **Logical Form in the Philosophical Investigations**

Early Wittgenstein's understanding of "logical form" can be traced in three aspects of the TLP: 1) Its prefacing, 2) Its organisation, 3) Its theses. From the same aspects of PI, a different understanding of "logical form" emerges:

The preface represents the book's form as "criss-cross travel" over "a wide field of thought".

The bulk of the book is a numbered sequence of separate, but interconnected ideas. This textual form can be read as a report from "road crosses", "villages", "towns" on that "wide field of thought"; a "traveller's journal", or a "road map" in prose.

There is no explicit discussion about "logical form" in the *Investigations* – but there are theses with such implications. For example, "The human body is the best picture of the human soul." (p.178), suggesting that the logic of the *brain* is the best picture of the logic of *thought*.

While in the *Tractatus* the "logical form" that rules "logical thought" is sought for in the logic of propositional languages, Wittgenstein's later work rejects that idea, seeking to find the "form" elsewhere; in the logics of physical travel and of bodily functions. I want to emphasise as strongly as possible the significance of that shift.

A new model has recently become available, that can help us understand what logical form the later Wittgenstein may have been getting at: a model provided by *machine learning* logics, demonstrating the logical potential of *neural networks*, developed by inspiration from the *neurosciences*. By the light of that model, ideas of "criss-cross travel in thought", and a "brain-thought" model, seem to anticipate the *non-symbolic* logical form by which DNNs do their intellectual magic.

Filip Gołaszewski (University of Warsaw)

### **Logic and metaphysics – remarks on Hegel and early Wittgenstein**

The aim of my presentation is to look on the relation between metaphysics and logic in Hegel's *Science of Logic* and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. According to Hegel logic became the proper form of metaphysics. To some extent early Wittgenstein seems to share this Hegelian view. Although he was openly critical when it comes to metaphysics, his work may be understood – in analogy to Kantian *Critique of Pure Reason* – as a linguistic form of a transcendental metaphysic. *Tractatus* describes the logical structure of the world and therefore it may be understood as an attempt to grasp its metaphysical dimension. However, there are profound differences between Hegel's and Wittgenstein's understanding of logic. Those are implied by the state of the scientific knowledge and the development of logic itself. While Hegel's *Science of Logic* may be understood as an attempt to break with the Aristotelian paradigm, Wittgenstein remains in a dialog with already developing new logical tradition, which originates mostly from Gottlob Frege's writings. In this sense Wittgenstein seems to be focused mostly on resolving certain difficulties which arise from the Fregean perspective. Therefore, we may say that Wittgenstein operates on the already shaped logical framework. For Hegel the main goal was to reinvent logic in correspondence with the development of spirit, meaning the actual state of the philosophical knowledge (represented mostly by his own philosophy). In this sense Hegel and Wittgenstein operated in an entirely different contexts. In my presentation I would like to compare Hegel's and Wittgenstein's views on logic focusing on their basic ideas. I will argue that there is a correspondence between logic and metaphysics both in Hegel and in Wittgenstein. However, when we compare details of their logical theories we discover completely different metaphysical landscapes. This comparison may shed some light on the metaphysical implication of the logical theory. Although both philosophers presents entirely different logical conceptions their shared

conviction about the fundamental importance of logic in philosophy, seems to be interesting. Hopefully, this presentation may become the point of reference for further investigations concerning the relation between logic and metaphysics in Hegel and Wittgenstein.

Jonas Held (University of Leipzig)

### **Wittgenstein on Moore's Paradox and the Nature of Logic**

After G.E. Moore's talk at the *Cambridge Moral Since Club* about what is today known as Moore's Paradox, Wittgenstein wrote him a letter. In response to Moore's example of the paradoxical assertion "There is a fire in this room and I don't believe there is", Wittgenstein writes the following: "To call this, as I think you did, 'an absurdity for *psychological* reasons' seems to me to be wrong, or *highly* misleading."

Instead, Wittgenstein says: "You have said something about the *logic* of assertion." The aim of my talk is to show what it is that Moore's Paradox says about the logic of assertion and why Wittgenstein emphasizes the word logic. Today, Moore's paradox is often read as a paradox concerning the self-ascription of belief. For Wittgenstein, however, a reflection on Moore's paradox is not only a reflection on mental attitudes and acts like belief and judgment, but also and essentially a reflection on the contents beliefs and judgments are directed at. Wittgenstein's reflection on Moore's paradox can be read as a critique on the Fregean picture of propositional content, According to Wittgenstein, by contrast, propositional contents are not independent from their appearance in concrete language games like asserting, questioning, hoping etc. As I will show, Wittgenstein's discussion of Moore's paradox is in this sense a reflection on the nature of propositional attitudes that includes a reflection on both parts of this term, on what mental attitudes are on the one hand and on the nature of propositional content on the other hand. Because the Fregean picture of propositional content was very prominent in 20<sup>th</sup> century analytic philosophy – and still is, Wittgenstein's critique can be read as a critique of the standard interpretation of propositional content.

In my talk, I will first ask why Wittgenstein takes it to be wrong to give a psychological interpretation of Moore's Paradox, and second, why he takes the paradox to say something about the nature of propositional content and, more fundamental, about the nature of logic. I will try to answer these questions with reference to his discussion of the topic in the *Philosophical Investigations* and the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. In my answer to the first question, I will show that Wittgenstein's argument that it is generally wrong to give a psychological interpretation of the paradox reveals some important facts about the use of the verb 'believe'. In assertions of the form "I believe that p", the verb 'believe' does not function as a referring term. It does not refer to a mental state or a mental event of any kind. I will show this by relating Wittgenstein's reflections on Moore's Paradox to contemporary reflections on the transparency of belief. propositional contents are explanatory primary to the different speech acts, in which they are according to which employed.

In the main part of my talk, I will then show in what sense Wittgenstein's reflection on Moore's paradox can be read as discussion concerning the nature of propositional content. Most discussions today about Moore's paradox start by distinguishing the paradoxical sentence "p, but I don't believe it" from the formal or logical contradiction "p and not-p" and they presuppose an independent and prior



understanding of the latter. Wittgenstein, however, argues in his later philosophy that no such independent and prior understanding of formal contradictions is possible, because we cannot isolate the propositional content  $p$  from its concrete use in language, including sentences like "I believe that  $p$ ". This would be, as if the sentence, spoken by a gramophone, belonged to pure logic; as if here it had the pure logical sense; as if here we had before us the object which logicians get hold of and consider--while the sentence as asserted, communicated, is what it is in *business*." Interpreting Wittgenstein's discussion of Moore's paradox in this sense as a discussion about the nature of propositional content will reveal the sense in which Wittgenstein takes Moore's paradox to show "that logic isn't as simple as logicians think it is. In particular: that contradiction isn't the *unique* thing people think it is".

David F. Hoinski (West Virginia University)

### **Irrational Reminders: Transcendence in Hegel and Wittgenstein**

The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth.—Tao Te Ching

Hegel and Wittgenstein would seem to be very far apart when it comes to their respective beliefs about the nature of reality and what mind can do. While Hegel is famously the philosopher of a comprehensive grasping (or overgrasping) of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) by reason, Wittgenstein is famous for attempting in the *Tractatus* to draw the bounds of rationality itself. Hegel is the philosopher of immanence (or of the world's immanence to reason), whereas Wittgenstein retains a belief in transcendence (or in what transcends reason altogether). Despite this apparent difference, however, there is a way in which Hegel and Wittgenstein mirror each other on the subject of the irrational. What is striking is that they discover irrationality at opposite ends of the spectrum that stretches from the empirical to the ideal. For Hegel it is precisely the starting point of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in sense-certainty that proves incapable of articulating the truth of its own content. Only thinking over empirical experience brings out its truth. Wittgenstein, meanwhile, though by no means a naïve empirical realist, presents us with a conception of logic that pictures atomic facts and states of affairs in the world. What cannot be spoken or grasped rationally for him is that which excludes any reference to an object. I will argue, however, that even in this respect Wittgenstein and Hegel are not so far apart as it might seem. For both Hegel and Wittgenstein logic inheres in being or actuality (what is rational is actual, the world is all that is the case, etc.), but it is also defined by an irrational remainder that we must recognize and accommodate.

Herbert Hrachovec (University Vienna)

### **Twice is Better? 2 x 2 Foundations of Logic**

The expression "foundations" has a deeper meaning besides its common one. A building rests on its foundation, which is itself grounded. This point can be applied to both Wittgenstein's and Hegel's "foundations of logic". The foundation provided by the logic of the *Tractatus* is "the general propositional form" as precondition of all scientifically permissible, meaningful propositions. This general formula, for its part, does not hang in the air, but is built upon Frege's and Russell's specifications.

Hegel's "science of logic" seems to spread out from nothing into an all-encompassing method (his dialectic), but there again is a substructure underlying the system. In his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel undertakes to prove the emergence of dialectics itself from pre-propositional "sense-certainty".

The term "logic", when applied to Hegel and Wittgenstein, is a polysemy. Their conceptions differ starkly. The metaphor "foundation" nevertheless shows a functional similarity between both meanings. Wittgenstein derived his logic from mathematical constructions in the sense of Russellian logicism and made it the unquestionable standard of rationality. He has, *after the deed was done*, turned away from these presuppositions. There is no rupture in Hegel's approach. His dialectic takes the steady path to the absolute. But note that, conversely to Wittgenstein's *transgression* of the propositional dimension, Hegel's *ingression into* propositional arguments takes place *at the beginning* of the *Phenomenology*. According to Wittgenstein, one is not supposed to *climb down* the ladder, whereas Hegel mediates *the entry into* rational discourse.

Wittgenstein develops a formal solution on mathematical foundations and takes leave of it. Hegel's starting position, the evolving consciousness, basically anticipates the result of its unfolding. Dialectic thinking has flourished in the humanities. Wittgenstein, who stayed away from it all his life, pursues the issues of his erstwhile logic differently.

Lucian Ionel (University of Leipzig)

### **Logic and Natural History**

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein rejects what could be called the myth of the logical shadow: the idea that, to acquire and use concepts, we need a more fundamental capacity to grasp concepts—i.e., we need to first interpret a conceptual rule to be able to follow it.

In rejecting the myth of the logical shadow, Wittgenstein advances two arguments: (1) conceptual practices like questioning and storytelling are part of our natural history just as walking and drinking (PI §25); (2) what explains our capacity to follow conceptual rule is the fact that we have been trained to do so (PI §190, §198). In the first respect, our conceptual practices rest on a "shared human way of doing things (*gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise*)" (PI §206). In the second respect, our conceptual practices are a matter of customs and habits (PI §199). These two arguments appear thus to be in conflict: the conventional nature of customs seems to contradict the universality of human practices. If we give up the latter, the idea that our conceptual practices can be justified only as inculcated habits introduces another myth: the myth of historical captivity.

My talk will address the following question: how can we conceive of our capacity to follow conceptual rules while avoiding both the myth of the logical shadow and the myth of historical captivity? In addressing it, I will draw on another argument which is germinal in Wittgenstein: the capacity to justify a conceptual practice is not intelligible independently from its exercise, i.e., from being engaged in that activity. My talk will develop the primacy of the activity in our capacity to follow rules, arguing that, while our conceptual practices are enabled by a historically inherited framework, we are able to assess, question, and revise inherited norms by engaging in the activities they codify. The line of argument will achieve two main things: (1) it

will revive the Hegelian sense in which *Geist* is self-determining while avoiding the myth of the logical shadow; (2) it will undermine the idea that we acquire conceptual practices merely by being trained while explaining, to use an expression of Anscombe's, how "what one actually does (...) fixes the meaning" of a rule.

Shuhei Kimoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

### **Elucidation and Therapy in Hegel's Logic**

This presentation focuses on whether Hegel's logic follows a constructive or elucidative method. By 'constructive,' I refer to an approach that initiates the inquiry from foundational concepts and gradually constructs a systematic framework. While Hegel's philosophy is often regarded as systematic, his logic does not develop in a constructive manner in this sense. At first glance, it may appear that Hegel's logic proceeds from primitive concepts to higher-level ones. However, the crux of this process lies in manifestation that what initially seems to be foundational concepts actually have various presuppositions. In other words, Hegel's logic unfolds by exposing these indispensable presuppositions rather than following a step-by-step bottom-up approach as foundationalism would suggest.

Within this context, I will focus on Hegel's methodological demand that philosophy not interfere the autonomy of thought. According to Hegel, philosophy should not attempt to reduce all thinking to concepts that it takes as foundational, as this would hinder the freedom of thought itself. Instead, Hegel proposes a different requirement: to abstain from unnecessary endeavors and merely observe the free movement of thought. This demand evokes similarities with Wittgenstein's perspective in the *Investigations*, where he calls for philosophy to do nothing unnecessary and just describe the workings of language. What they share is the understanding that certain philosophies have a negative aspect, as they undermine the autonomy of language and thought. In the case of Wittgenstein, this understanding motivates the idea of philosophy as therapy. Although they employ the terminology of 'observation' and 'description,' the aim is not to acquire empirical knowledge but rather to clarify self-reflective understanding of the nature of our logical activities.

By drawing attention to these similarities with Wittgenstein's approach, we can shed light on the therapeutic dimension inherent in Hegelian logic.

Daniel Kuran (University of Vienna)

### **Hegel on Logic and the "original word"**

In his *Lecture on Ethics* Wittgenstein reflects among other things on the experience of wondering at the existence of the world, which might also be seen as the fundamental experience of metaphysics. According to Wittgenstein the "right expression in language for the miracle of the existence of the world, though it is not any proposition *in* language, is the existence of language itself." Although according to Wittgenstein everything we can say about the absolute miraculous is still nonsense, this point of view allows for an interesting perspective on Hegel's *Science of Logic*, which, according to Hegel's claim, takes over the role of metaphysics. In the final chapter of the *Science of Logic* on the absolute idea, Hegel determines his logic as

the presentation of “the self-movement of the absolute idea only as the original word, a word which is an *utterance*, but one that in being externally uttered has immediately vanished again.” According to the main thesis of my contribution this passage by Hegel has to be understood in the sense that Hegel’s *Science of Logic* does not simply coincide with the “original word” but simultaneously determines itself as the negative vanishing of the original word. This means that in the *Science of Logic*, understood as self-determination of pure thought, the movement of self-determination is identical with its self-sublation. The logicity of logical determinations in Hegel’s *Science of Logic* does neither consist in the existence of a set of categories or propositions nor in their interrelations but in the negativity of their self-sublation. Hegel’s logic is written as the self-erasure of the logos. In other words, Hegel’s logic can be read as a presentation of language which does not exist in the forms of propositions but has its speculative-logical existence as the sublation of these propositions. In modification of Wittgenstein’s above mentioned idea, it is not the “existence” of language, but the self-negating nature of language that founds the movement of speculative logic. If language in this sense is to be seen as a foundation of logic, then only in the negative sense that it is founded on sublating its own foundations. In order to outline this perspective on Hegel’s logic I will refer to passages from Hegel’s chapter on the absolute idea and demonstrate how this understanding is supported by Hegel’s remarks on the speculative proposition in the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

David Lindeman (Georgetown University)

### **Hegel and Wittgenstein on Logic as First Philosophy**

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. (*John 1:1*)

‘To pray is to think about the meaning of life’, Wittgenstein writes in the *Notebooks*—that is, provided the identification made there and in the *Tractatus*: to think of the meaning of the world (NB 11.6.16, TLP 5.621). This is the same as thinking of the meaning of being: to pray, then, is to ask the *Seinsfrage*. But still another identification is made in the *Notebooks* which makes apposite the invocation of prayer: ‘The meaning of life [...] we can call God.’ That ‘logic is first philosophy’, as Wittgenstein writes in his ‘Notes on Logic’, is justified by identification of God in turn with the logos, the principle of reason or intelligibility.

‘In the beginning was the logos’, it was said; and it continued: ‘the logos was with God, and the logos was God’. The identification is made also in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, where he likewise makes it clear that logic is first philosophy. Of course, in Hegel, logic’s account of the logos is at the same time an account of the thinking subject, capable of actualizing the Concept, movement of logical thinking in its self-comprehension: thought thinking thought. Do we have a departure from Wittgenstein here? In spirit, not at all. The ‘metaphysical subject’ is, as it is put in the *Notebooks*, a presupposition of the existence of the world (NB 2.8.16) and in the *Tractatus* it is identified, along with the limits of logic, with the limit of the world (TLP, 5.6, 5.61, 5.632, 5.641). So it is, on this day in the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein observes: ‘My work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world’ (NB 2.18.16), or as he had put it earlier: ‘the nature of all being’ (22.1.15 the ) The logical structure of thought, as the *Tractatus* makes clear, is the structure of the world. No Kantian distinction is here drawn between the phenomenal and noumenal, and in all this there is profound agreement between Wittgenstein and Hegel. Perhaps this

convergence should come as no surprise, if Hegel is correct, in that 'God is the one and only object of philosophy' (LPR 1, 84; VPR 1, 3), that 'philosophy is theology': they have both 'hit the nail on the head'. But if the parallels carry our interpretation this far, it might also seem to break down at just this point. For whereas, by design, Hegel's philosophy speaks to the 'inner truth' of what we go on to read in John, that 'the logos was made flesh', this appears contradicted by Wittgenstein's remark that 'the world' (TLP 6.432). And yet, here, too, I argue, we find a parallel—and it is key to a proper 'God does not reveal himself *in* understanding of the *Tractatus*.

Silvia Locatelli (University of Lisbon)

### **Logic as Dance: an Analysis of Movement in the Logic of Hegel and the Later Wittgenstein**

Through my talk, I will attempt to show an interesting affinity between Hegelian logic and the logic underlying the language of the later Wittgenstein. Indeed, they share the aspect of being two dynamic logics or, more poetically, dancing logics. On the one hand, Hegelian logic appears as the dynamic process through which thought, free and in the absence of any presupposition, self-determines and structures its rational process. In such a path, thought moves freely, almost as if forming a dance that is both improvised - as it is not preset - and necessary - following the forms that fundamentally structure the logical process in its essence. Indeed, in the section of the doctrine of the concept dedicated to the absolute idea, the concept of life is presented in a logical sense - and thus in a pure sense, devoid of the connotation of natural or spiritual life. This tells us much about the dancing and vital character of Hegelian logic. It, being a vital matter, in its 'dancing process' cannot but encounter the structure of living organic matter. On the other hand, the concept of a logic-linguistic structure as dance in the later Wittgenstein can be understood from its connection with the term form of life (*Lebensform*). In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein claims how: 'The speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life' (*PI*: §23). This makes it clear how language - and its logic - is a dynamic activity, something that is part of a wider activity that is that of the form of life. In this sense, the logic-linguistic structure for the second Wittgenstein is something related to life, and therefore something that is itself vital, that dances, changes and transforms in relation to what happens in the form of life of which it is part.

Saori Makino (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

### **Logical Notation and Everyday Language; Salvaging the Conception of Logic**

In *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter, *PI*), Wittgenstein seemed to see in "logic" something an origin of our fallacy. This can be found in various passages in *PI*. "The sentence and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be something pure and clear-cut" (*PI* 105). "(T)he conflict between it [actual language] and our requirement", i.e. "the crystalline purity of logic", becomes the greater (*PI* 107). "The *preconception* of crystalline purity" (*PI* 108, italic is original) is a hindrance to grasp our ordinary language and linguistic activities. (Cf. *PI* 89, 97)

However, it does not seem that the conception of “logic” should be abandoned altogether. Rather, the problem would be our way of treating “logic” as being out of reality. We have “a tendency to sublimate the logic of our language” (*PI* 38). “(W)e’re tempted to misunderstand the logic of our expressions here, to give an incorrect account of the use of our words.” (*PI* 345). In *PI*, Wittgenstein tries to draw our attention to ourselves who are apt to consider “logic” to be “ideal” (*PI* 81).

The aim of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy would not be to prohibit using the word “logic”, but to examine our way of treating the word. I would like to state that we had better focus on logical notation to achieve the aim. Our “preconception” (*PI* 108) of logic will be disappeared when logical notation employed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* can be dissolve into our everyday language. On my presentation, I will demonstrate how to realize this way of philosophical activities.

Nikolay Milkov (University of Paderborn)

### **Hegel and Wittgenstein as Idealistic Philosophers**

Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* was interpreted for years as work on metaphysics. According to this interpretation, adopted by Norman Malcolm, Peter Hacker and David Pears, among others, the Tractarian objects are metaphysical entities that are parts of the ultimate structure of the world. Recent studies of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* (McGinn 2006, Engelmann 2021) demonstrated, however, that the Tractarian objects were only introduced in order to make the logic of depiction, valid both for the everyday language and for the language of science, understandable.

Wittgenstein developed related argument also in the 1930s and 1940s. For him now philosophical investigations are conceptual investigations (1984, i, § 949), while the concepts themselves are set out by human conceptual practice. This argument made some interpreters, Thomas Nagel and Michael N. Forster, among them, to maintain that in his *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein was an idealist philosopher. Unfortunately, they are silent about the idealism of the *Tractatus*.

That Hegel was an idealist philosopher goes without saying. What really matters for our study is that, arguably, and similarly to Wittgenstein, Hegel discussed the categories in his *Logic* only in order to lay down the hypothetical structure of what is thinkable. In other words, his categories only put to light the intelligible. They have no existential import. Hegel’s logic can be consistently read as category theory that has nothing to do with metaphysics (Hartmann 1972).

Perhaps a more balanced position holds Anton Koch (2007). According to Koch, Hegel’s “first philosophy” is his logic (or ontology)—it explores the *Sein*. It lays down the hypothetical structure of the intelligible. In contrast, Hegel’s “second philosophy” explores the *Dasein*. It suggests a theory of the general characteristics of reality. It is a kind of cosmology.

Anirban Mukherjee (North Bengal University)

### **Dialectics and Progress: A Comparative Examination of Hegel and Wittgenstein**

Hegel, with his profound engagement with logic, presents a compelling argument for the integration of dialectics and progress within the realm of philosophical inquiry. Hegel's logic encompasses a dialectical method that facilitates the development of concepts through the resolution of contradictions. This dialectical process propels thought forward, leading to a progressive movement towards higher levels of understanding.

In contrast, Wittgenstein's approach to logic deviates from Hegel's dialectical perspective. In contrast, Wittgenstein's logic concentrates on the structure and rules of language, aiming to clarify meanings and address the limits of language. In his early work and draws attention to the diversity of language games and the contextual nature of meaning in his later work. He emphasizes the multiplicity of language games, each with its own set of rules and meanings, existing within specific socio-cultural contexts. Wittgenstein's focus lies in the analysis of language and the clarification of concepts, without positing a linear progression or the need to resolve contradictions.

Examining these contrasting viewpoints raises important questions regarding the nature of progress within the realm of logic. Hegel's emphasis on dialectics and progressive development suggests that contradictions serve as the impetus for intellectual growth and the attainment of higher forms of understanding. In this framework, progress emerges as an inherent feature of logical inquiry, driven by the ongoing resolution of contradictions.

On the other hand, Wittgenstein's emphasis on the contextual nature of meaning and the diversity of language games challenges the notion of progress within logic. By highlighting the situatedness of language games and the multiplicity of meanings, Wittgenstein invites us to question the need for a teleological progression in our understanding of logic. This paper deals with the contrasting perspective on dialectics and progress in logic and critically evaluates the underlying assumptions and implications of each philosopher's position.

Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast (Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt)

### **Examining the Logic of the Language Game of Religion in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy**

Wittgenstein developed the idea of language-games in his later philosophy and held that there is no single logic that lies behind different forms of language awaiting discovery by the philosopher, rather each language game has its specific logic. The logic of each language game consists of its rules and grammar. To determine the correct use of words and concepts in each language game, we should resort to the rules and grammar of that specific language game. Not only logic is dethroned from its metaphysical status, but concepts such as time, causality, duration, and God cannot be considered as descriptions of metaphysical entities either. All such words need to be placed within the relevant language games. Therefore, the traditional philosophical questions such as 'what is time?' or 'what is God?' cannot be posed and the philosopher should refrain from finding the essence of time or God and the common hidden element behind all the uses of 'time' or 'God' in our language.

Instead, the philosopher should seek to describe how 'time' or 'God' are used and should be understood in different language games. This has radical consequences for our understanding of the language game of religion because, in the theistic traditions God is thought of as a metaphysical being transcending our world and language. In this paper, I will first examine how the logic of religion ought to be understood. Then I will examine some of the Wittgensteinian arguments against the metaphysical conception of God. Finally, I will argue that despite what some critics have argued the Wittgensteinian conception of the language game of religion and the logic of religion does not reduce religion to ethics (e.g., Cook 1988), it does not go against all religious traditions (e.g., Law 2017), and it does not safeguard religion from rational criticism (e.g., Nielsen 1967).

David Palme (University of Erfurt)

### **Built on sand?**

#### **Why Wittgenstein (and Hegel) thought about Robinson Crusoe**

Hegel and Wittgenstein connected vital elements of their philosophy with Daniel Defoe's famous novel: Robinson Crusoe. Hegel describes his lord-bondsman-dialectic as the "story of Crusoe and Friday", and Wittgenstein used Robinson to illustrate his question of linguistic privacy in many unpublished notes. In both cases, the philosophers suggest that whatever is the foundation of consciousness or language, respectively, it is not a single individual alone.

The paper discusses Wittgenstein's notes and thoughts containing Robinson and the debates about them. These debates start with the question of whether a single individual can speak. However, they can be reconstructed as being concerned with logical necessity: What is the foundation of the logical must? Wittgenstein himself agrees that his idea of "agreement in the form of life" "seems to abolish logic", yet he adds, "but does not do so" (PI 1953: §241f.).

The talk claims that both authors were indeed troubled with the relation of logic and society and referred to Robinson Crusoe as the personification of the philosophical "I" as an independent human being. Thus, Robinson is the antithesis of a strong foundation of logic in the social world. While some argue that the reference to Robinson is an endorsement of this claim, the paper will argue that both regarded society as a necessary precondition of logic.

Ivo Pezlar (Masaryk University)

#### **Wittgenstein's Notion of Contradiction as a Hint to Act and not to Consider**

In this talk, we revisit some of Wittgenstein's ideas about the nature of contradiction and use them to propose a new approach to the notion of absurdity in the context of natural deduction. The notion of absurdity is of great importance as it is commonly used to express other fundamental logical notions and devices such as negation (as an implication of absurdity, i.e., a disproof or refutation), method of indirect proof (i.e., the *reductio ad absurdum* rule), or the explosion principle (i.e., the *ex falso quodlibet* rule).

To be more specific, Wittgenstein remarked, e.g., that "The contradiction might be conceived as a hint from the gods that I am to act and not consider" (Remarks on the



Foundations of Mathematics, RFM, III-58; 130e) and that “[o]ne is inclined to say that the contradiction leaves you no room for action” (Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, LFM, p. 185). If we take these ideas seriously (and others related to them), they can lead us to a new approach to absurdity based on the notion of the impossible command, i.e., a call to action that cannot be obeyed as it commands us to do something impossible. The resulting action of such a command is of course no action. We would be jammed, as Wittgenstein put it (LFM, p. 179), as we would not know what to do.

We will present a logical system based on this idea. Specifically, we will introduce a system of natural deduction that deals not only with assertions and assumptions but also with commands, specifically with the impossible command which we regard as a suitable explication of absurdity. Interestingly, not much has to change in the standard natural deduction rules to accommodate this approach to absurdity.

Marco Rienzi (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)

### **The Critique of the Propositional Form in Hegelian Philosophy**

The aim of this paper is to emphasise the relationship between language and thought within Hegelian philosophy. More specifically, I will turn to the theory of the speculative proposition as an immanent critique of the limits of the ordinary propositional form.

First, I will highlight the role of the absence of presuppositions (*Voraussetzungslosigkeit*) within Hegel’s philosophy, a feature on which some recent scholars such as Houlgate (see *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity*, 2006) have insisted. An emblematic case of presupposition is that of the language, which, with its set of syntactic and grammatical structures, conditions human experience of the world as well as the philosophy, that in languages expresses itself.

Secondly, I will focus on the difficulties posed by the propositional form to thought. In this regard, I will consider the pages of the *Vorrede* to the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* about the speculative proposition, as well as some insights drawn from the discussion of the *Re<lexionsbestimmungen* in the first section of the *Wesenslehre*. Indeed, in these places Hegel highlights the problem of the one-sidedness of the proposition in its effort to express the speculative content. An example is the difference between subject and predicate, which suggests an inadequate substantiality for the expression of the concept.

Finally, I will propose an interpretation of the speculative proposition as an immanent critique of the inherent limitations of the proposition. In line with the first part of the talk, Hegel’s aim is to *critically* discuss the propositional structure, identifying limitations and one-sidedness in relation to the speculative. And yet, unlike authoritative interpreters such as Klaus Düsing, I do not believe that the purpose is to identify more proper forms of the proposition as opposed to the ordinary one. On the contrary, I maintain that Hegel’s aim is to highlight a different *mode* of addressing the same propositional structure.

João Esteves da Silva (University of Lisbon)

### **PHILOSOPHY: THERAPY OR SELF-SCIENCE?**

In this talk, I shall consider two conceptions of philosophy, Wittgensteinian therapy (the practice of assembling reminders for the purpose of dissolving philosophical confusions) and Hegelian self-science (that which articulates what one knows oneself to be), and suggest that they can be fruitfully combined. (In fact, Wittgensteinian therapy can itself be seen as a form of self-science and Hegelian self-science as a form of therapy.) In order to illustrate this, drawing upon both Wittgensteinian and Hegelian aspects, I shall sketch an account of a priori knowledge, i.e., of the truths that delineate the necessary structure of our mindedness: (1) The knowledge these truths articulate is self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of our self-consciously possessed and exercised capacities, and is only available, as it were, from within, not from sideways-on. (2) These truths are a priori in that they are potentially within the grasp of any full-fledged human being, regardless of what particular bodies of empirical knowledge they possess, for they are implicit in any of their cognitive practices. (3) Though a priori, in this sense, they are not simply (endogenously) Given, for, though their grasp is independent of any particular experiences, it is nonetheless mediated by one's life in the world qua knower and agent. (4) To call a truth "necessary" is to acknowledge that it does not (presently) possess an intelligible negation, not to appeal to some putative metaphysical guarantee of its special status. (5) Besides, we should be skeptical of the very idea of a fixed stock of such truths, prior to their disclosure through the actual practice of philosophical clarification, a practice which, born out of the need to respond to puzzlement and confusion, goes on and on. (6) In fact, there seems to be little point in seeking to articulate such truths independently of this essentially responsive practice.

Timur Uçan (Bordeaux Montaigne University)

### **Contemporary Readings and Problematics of Private Language in the Works of Hegel and Wittgenstein**

Negarestani's *Intelligence and Spirit* (2018) addresses anew the problematic of private language, by interrogating the works of Hegel with that of Wittgenstein and inversely. Negarestani attempts to reconceive functionalism against the background of a reading of the works of Kant, Hegel and Wittgenstein to account and develop a conception of intelligence and spirit which integrates advances realized in cognitive sciences, information sciences, robotics and AI. However, the opening presumption of the equivalence of the notions of private language involved by Negarestani's reading of Hegel and by Wittgenstein's criticism of private language in *Philosophical Investigations* is utterly contestable. As argued by Descombes, "objective spirit" could prove only *that* which could not have failed to be legitimate (2014). Yet we cannot without erraticism skip what in the philosophical project of Negarestani – explicitly *decolonial* – does not lend itself not only to Negarestani's but also to Descombes' philosophical projects, that is to say, straightaway, that what could not have been legitimate could finally become such. This question is not secondary, inasmuch as the philosophical project of "second nature", is not without ambiguity; philosophical inheritance *requires* decolonial criticism. Peculiarly *slavery* could not have been legitimate, and yet exists (See Global Estimates of Modern Slavery 2017). The alleged abstract overcoming of such state of affairs is at best misleading. I thus shall propose a study of Negarestani's assumption of the equivalence of the notions

and problematics of private language in the works of Hegel and Wittgenstein. I then shall propose a reassessment of this assumption in regard of texts of Hegel and Wittgenstein, recent comparative studies of their philosophies, and of Bouveresse's recent work *Les vagues du langage*. I finally will propose elements of an alternative decolonial and comparative reading of the problematics of private language in the works of Wittgenstein and Hegel.

Juan Andrés Vargas (Diego Portales University)

### **The prevalence of the rule-following problem in Kant and Hegel.**

The aim of my paper is twofold: first, to identify some idealist *topos* in the tradition running from Kant to Hegel that are notoriously akin to the Wittgenstenian problem of rule-following; second, to subject them to a critical evaluation of whether their solutions follow a distinguishable Wittgenstenian strategy; but also, to delve into how the way in which the problem is differently embodied by the thought of both German thinkers sheds some light on how we should approach the relationship between their respective "systems." To this end I will second the interpretive proposal advanced by authors such as Wolfgang Wieland, Béatrice Longuenesse, and Alejandro Vigo, each of whom has suggested that, in the context of *KrV*, the problem of the application of concepts to intuitions can be overcome by exploiting the yields of the reflective use of the faculty of judgment. I will argue that, though suggestive, if this line of reasoning is correct (as I believe it is), the Kantian solution to the problem of rule-following retains a certain idealistic character that is difficult to reconcile with Wittgenstein's pragmatic, and in a sense naturalistic, solution. Finally, drawing on some readings from Robert Brandom and David Landy I will argue that Hegel, while retaining intuitions dear to Kant, offers, from his treatment of the figure of desire in the *PhG*, a path that does greater justice to the role that, as Wittgenstein rightly saw, the social practices must contribute to the solution of the dilemma.

Vincent Vincke (University of Brussels)

### **The Arbitrariness of Ethics.**

#### **Pursuing Wittgenstein's Suggested Analogy to Logic and Mathematics.**

In this paper I pursue Wittgenstein's suggestion to treat the 'arbitrariness' of ethics "on lines analogous to those on which one would treat the question *whether mathematics or whether logic is arbitrary.*" Wittgenstein made this suggestion in a conversation with Rush Rhees on September 12, 1945.

Central to that exchange was his rejection of the idea of determining a particular system of ethics to be "the right one" or "nearer to the right one".

This because, according to Wittgenstein, the idea of 'the right ethics' not only assumes substantial grounds for comparing ethical systems but maintains the possibility of independent criteria or standards to evaluate them objectively. To deny this, of course, begs the question whether "the adoption or recognition of a particular ethical system is arbitrary."

For Wittgenstein, however, to argue that mathematics or logic are 'in some sense' arbitrary, is not to argue that they are 'unimportant' or 'easily alterable'. It is rather

directed against the idea that logical necessity and truth are (directly) determined by or accountable to something that lies beyond the rules and norms of a particular calculus or technique, such as a (super)empirical reality.

My aim is thus precisely to examine Wittgenstein's suggested analogy, and to inquire how and to what extent his conception of the 'arbitrariness' of mathematics and logic would /did inform his rejection of the question of 'the right ethics'.

To that end, I will first outline the *various senses* in which the Middle and Later Wittgenstein, respectively, conceived mathematics and logic to be 'arbitrary'. I will secondly use these results to clarify Wittgenstein's understanding of the arbitrariness of ethics, and, finally, I will argue that this understanding was implicit in Wittgenstein's conversation with Rhees. More specifically, in his addressal of what it means to adhere to an ethical system.

Samuel Vitel (Université de Poitiers)

### **What identity theory of truth does Hegel hold in his *Logic*?**

In recent Hegelian literature, it has become common to attribute to Hegel an identity theory of truth (Baldwin, 1991; Pippin, 2019; Brandom, 2019) and to associate such a position, in broad terms, with a Tractarian model for the thought-world relationship (McDowell, 1994). Instead of a correspondence model that relates thought and the world as two heterogeneous entities that must somehow be held to correspond, the identity theory asserts that the content of a true thought and that of a fact are simply identical. This indeed fits nicely with Hegel's contempt for truth understood as correctness (*Richtigkeit*), as a "formal" relationship between thought and its object, and his criticism of all conceptions, like Kant's, that see reality as something irreducibly foreign to thought's grasp. It, however, seems more difficult to render it compatible with Hegel's positive definition of truth as something that applies, not to the relationship between thought and things, but to the relationship between things and their own immanent concepts that determine the standards to which they must conform to really be the things they are: "truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity between objectivity and the concept. It is in this [...] sense that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art." (Hegel, 1975, §213).

We will not, however, follow Robert Stern's unequivocal rebuttal of the idea of a Hegelian identity theory of truth in the name of this "material" - not propositional - and normative - not descriptive - conception of truth (Stern, 1993). Offering a reading of Hegel's theory of judgment in the *Doctrine of Concept*, we will aim to show that this normative understanding of concepts is entirely compatible with an identity theory of truth, best understood as the identity between the prescriptive dimension of thought, made explicit in the form attributed to "judgment of the concept", and the norm-ladenness of Hegelian "facts" - that he calls *Sachen* in contrast to immediate *Dinge*. This will enable a justification of Hegel's logical project: the normative science of thinking can thus "coincide" with the ambitions of old-style metaphysics, understood as "the science of things" (Hegel, 1975, §24).

Michael Wee (Durham University)

### **Wittgenstein on the Practical Foundations of Logic**

Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* contains three important insights regarding the nature of logic and its foundations: (1) logic involves everything descriptive of a language-game (§56); (2) the boundary between logic or rules and empirical propositions is not sharp (§319); (3) logic is founded on acting (§204). How are these three claims related to one another? I argue that they are an expansion of Wittgenstein's developing views on logical inference as found in his remarks and lectures on mathematics. In the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, although Wittgenstein initially maintains a strict distinction between logical and empirical reasoning, he develops the view that the two forms of reasoning exist on a spectrum. Strict logical inference is grounded in nothing other than our use for it—sometimes strict logical reasoning serves our interests and practical activities (e.g. building a house with exact calculations), while at other times inductive inference and experimentation are called for. But the boundary between the two is not sharp, because logical reasoning is founded on prior experimentation; it has proved to pay in the past, so it becomes part of our certainties in acting. This lays the foundation for (2) and (3) to be developed in *On Certainty*, leading to a view of logic as thoroughly practical in its origins. The laws of logic, then, are not transcendent, but are simply the most general and strict application of any given language-game. This is why logic embraces everything as per (1); the necessity of logic is *our* necessity, and thus is only accessible from a first-person standpoint of acting within a language-game, and is manifested in the practical certainties that hinge propositions point to. I conclude by discussing parallels with Hegel's idea that the 'theoretical is essentially contained in the practical' in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*.

Christina Weiss (University of Darmstadt)

### **Towards a homogeneity of logical pictures in Hegel's *Logic of Being***

Although Hegel repeatedly emphasizes that the *Science of Logic* is not concerned with spatial or temporal conceptions, but with pure thought only, a peculiar form of spatiality or spatialization can be recognized in the genealogy of categories in the *Objective Logic*. A beautiful example of such spatial organization in Hegel's *Logic* can be found in connection with the analysis of *something* and *other*, that is, in connection with the explication of the *something-and-other-schema* in the *Doctrine of Being*. In the context of introducing the terms *determination*, *constitution* and *limit* one distinction proves to be of crucial importance: that is the distinction of *Ansichsein*<sup>1</sup> und *An-ihm-sein*. Whereas *Ansichsein* signifies the ideal identity-function maintaining the 'integrity' of *something* against *otherness*, *An-ihm-sein* signifies the necessary outwardness of the distinction against the *other*, implying mutual, so to speak, local limitation of *something* and *other*, and hereby otherness as a form of restrictedness of and as the local form of something.

In a nutshell, what we have here is the reflexive identity-function called *Ansichsein* on the one side, its operational manifestation or representation called *An-ihm-sein*

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<sup>1</sup> To avoid ambiguities in the translation of *Ansichsein* und *An-ihm-sein* I use the German terms.

on the other side. Now, it becomes clear throughout the argumentation, especially in the chapter on *Restriction and the ought* that Hegel doesn't consider the identity-function as something to be located beyond its local manifestations, but contrarily as some sort of generative rule 'sitting in' each local manifestation, actually presenting itself as a continuous transition from one local state (picture) to the other. In fact, the restricted states, which I called local states, unfold as continuous pictures in a self-similar operational space.

In my talk I want to highlight accordances with Wittgenstein's ideas on logical form in the *Tractatus*, especially with respect to representation and representability of logical form.

Chen Yang (Purdue University)

### **On the Formalization of Hegel's Dialectic Logic**

Encouraged by the development of paraconsistent logic, some Hegel scholars have attempted to formalize Hegel's dialectic logic (hereafter DL) (Priest, 1989, 2006; Ficara, 2022; Moss, 2023). Other scholars (Burbidge, 2007: 216; Bordignon: 2019: 211; Nuzzo, 2023: 174) argue that these attempts fail to capture the dynamic nature of the DL. But in his most recent paper (2023), Priest provides a formal model that successfully captures the dynamic nature of the DL and thus offers a powerful response to these critiques.

This paper examines Priest's most recent formal model and argues that it fails to accurately formalize the DL. This is the case because it relies on the tripartite structure of thesis- antithesis-synthesis. While this formal model successfully represents the dynamic transition from thesis to synthesis, it distorts some other structures in the DL. For example, the dialectic of finitude reveals a four-part structure, namely finitude - false infinity - infinite progression - true infinity, which differs from the tripartite structure.

Thus, while I agree with Bordignon and Nuzzo that Priest fails to accurately formalize the DL, I disagree with their reason why. I argue that it fails due to its emptiness, not its lack of motion. By emptiness, I mean that categories such as being and finitude are replaced by variables. Thus, their internal structures are abstracted. Yet, I show that it is the internal structures of categories that determine the corresponding dialectical structures. For example, the indeterminacy of being and the immediacy of nothing implies becoming, which in turn determines the tripartite structure. As soon as the categories are replaced by abstract variables in the process of formalization, as we see Priest do, their internal structures are lost, and certain dialectic structures become distorted.

In conclusion, if we are to have any hope of formalizing the DL, then we must first learn to formalize the internal structures of the categories.

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### **Universality and Self-Reference of Logic in Wittgenstein and Hegel**

In my paper I would like to deal with a problem which is based in the claim of logic to universality. If logic is to make statements about what constitute concepts, propositions or inferences in general, then what it says about them must also apply to that by means of which it says it. The problem resulting from this will be illustrated by Frege's account of the nature of propositions. The 'metalogical' proposition expressing this account, namely, that concepts in general are not objects, cannot be formed as a proposition at all because of just this account of object and concept. The conceptions of logic in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Hegel's *Science of Logic* will be presented as the endeavors to hold on to the universality of logic without what logic says about concepts, propositions, etc. being incompatible with the concepts, propositions, etc. by means of which it says this. However, Wittgenstein and Hegel implement this endeavor in diametrically opposed ways. Wittgenstein's radical solution to the problem, in short, conceives of propositions in such a way that they do not consist in employing concepts to ascribe properties to something. I will elucidate Wittgenstein's account of propositions by reference to the remarks of the *Tractatus* on elementary propositions. The extent to which for Wittgenstein the entire logic is contained in the structure of the elementary statement will then be treated by reference to the remarks on the truth-functions and the general propositional form. In contrast to Wittgenstein, for Hegel it is precisely the concept as such, viz. the concept 'concept' which contains the entire logic. Without going into the particular forms of judgment and inference, it will be shown, at least in outline, how both are contained in the concept 'concept'. Finally, I will expound why Wittgenstein's project of presenting the whole of logic as unfolding from a unified principle fails because he dispenses with concepts and, in particular, with the concept 'concept'.